Did Japan have speedboats during World War II?

Japan has always had torpedo boats in service during World War II and before World War II, but it did not pay much attention to them and did not achieve many results.

As early as 1917, the then Yokosuka Shipyard was ordered to build eight "large high-speed internal fire boats". At that time, there was no name for torpedo boats, but they were called "high-speed internal fire boats" (internal combustion engines). boat) or "Costal Motor Boat".

In the ninth year of the Showa Period (1934), the Japanese Navy commissioned a 13-meter boat built by Yokohama Yachts, No. 906. All three boats were completed in the tenth to eleventh years of the Showa Period (1935-193636). The main engine used two It has a 300-horsepower diesel engine and a design speed of 29 knots.

In the twelfth year of Showa (1937), another 16-meter boat was built, numbered No. 1000, equipped with an aviation gasoline engine. In the public test, it set a speed record of 43.05 knots, but its seaworthiness was still insufficient. (A common problem of small ships), so although several boats of the same type were later built by Yokohama Yachts, they were all used as torpedo test auxiliary boats.

During World War II, the U.S. Navy PT boats were extremely active. They took advantage of the numerous islands in Southeast Asia, complex waterway conditions, small size, and strong passability to sink Teruzuki. , the Uzuki destroyer, and the I-16 submarine forced the Japanese army to stop using submarines to supply the army on the island, and then sank many transport ships and severely damaged the "Abuwe". On the other hand, the Japanese Navy had built many torpedo boats before, and the Southeast Asian campaign At that time, more than ten Dutch torpedo boats were captured, but they were scattered everywhere. When there was a mission, the first thing that came to mind was the big ship, and the speedboats were reduced to cargo boats and traffic boats. Although the provisional military expansion budget of the Showa 18th year (1943) of the Showa 17th Year (1942) Wartime Ship Supplement Plan planned to build 18 80-ton Class A torpedo boats (of which 7 were suspended before construction), the Japanese Navy still did not We can understand the huge role of small ships in narrow waters, but Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, which is responsible for the production of the Seven-One Type 6 engine, is lagging behind due to insufficient special steel materials and poor processing accuracy, as well as the shipbuilding company's lack of experience in building large torpedo boats. The first boat built, No. 10, was completed more than a year later, in November of the 18th year of the Showa era.

At this time, there were fewer and fewer Japanese planes in the sky, and the speedboats, like the big ships, could only survive in the shadow of aerial bombs and rockets. The Type A boats themselves did not live up to expectations. They were originally planned to be used as command boats and maritime anti-submarine sentries for Type B torpedo boats. However, due to various reasons, the top speed of some boats was only 24 knots. As a result, only eight boats were built (one T-51a, T-51b type seven) was terminated early. As the war situation worsened, the boat began to carry reverse reconnaissance. In the 20th year of Showa (1945), the remaining boats were equipped with light sounders and used as radar sentries, and finally found something serious.

The real main force is the B-type boat. Starting in the 18th year of Showa, the Japanese army mobilized qualified units of its own country and the occupying countries to mass-produce small torpedo boats based on the T-1 to cope with the increasingly active The US military PT boat attempted to use torpedo boats to perform some tasks usually performed by destroyers. The engines used by these boats are very complex, mainly aviation engines, and most of them are old-model engines in stock. These boats are generally equipped with a 20mm cannon or 13mm machine gun, and two 450MM torpedoes.

The main force at the end of the war was the T-14 displacement boat, with a displacement of 14 tons, a length of 15 meters, a width of 3.6 meters, a draft of 0.6 meters, and a top speed of 33 knots. Basically, The weapons are the same as type B. It is characterized by enhanced defense capabilities, mainly armor, a steel plate is installed outside the fuel tank, bulletproof rubber is installed inside the tank, and a rotating window is installed in front of the wheelhouse. This boat also has a major feature, that is, the hull has a forecastle, and the torpedo loading is one level lower. Production began in October of Showa 19, with a plan to build 83 ships. By the time of the defeat, 71 ships were actually completed.

Counting it all together, Japan has a total of 618 torpedo boats of various types in the two stations (including those that were converted into gunboats due to reduced performance). Among them, self-built The largest number is the T-14 type numbered 538 (Hairenshe data), with 83 ships. The capture included 19 Dutch Navy torpedo boats, 7 of which were not completed until the end of the war. There is also an American speedboat, Japanese number 114.

The Japanese Navy has so many torpedo boats, but there are almost no commendable achievements. Most of them died in the explosion of gasoline engines and corrosion of the hull. According to official records, Almost all of them have the same completion date, ship registration, and serial number. Apart from that, there is nothing. Until the end of the war, 6 boats remained in mainland China.

The reasons are:

1 Since aluminum alloy materials are preferred for aircraft, most torpedo boats of the Japanese Navy use wooden shells and steel frames. In order to enhance seaworthiness, most of them use round bilges. Resulting in excessive weight and low speed

2 Japan lacks excellent small high-speed marine internal combustion engines and uses old aircraft engines in stock as emergency substitutes. As a result, many problems have occurred:

3 The organization of the torpedo boat force Too late, lack of sufficient tactical research and education and training