At that time, the U.S.-led NATO troops had been bombarding Yugoslavia for nine weeks, and Yugoslav President Milosevic was not ready to back down. Cohen's trip is to discuss the possibility of launching a ground invasion with NATO allies. The defense ministers of Britain, France, Germany and Italy were all called in. After six and a half hours of debate, the five ministers came to an important conclusion: their governments must decide whether to assemble ground troops, and they must make this choice within a few days.
Although President Clinton publicly ruled out the possibility of NATO's ground war from the day the air war began, the preparations for NATO's ground invasion of Kosovo have been going on, and the progress has far exceeded the publicly disclosed situation. On the one hand, NATO investigated the national defense situation of Yugoslavia through the "Kosovo Liberation Army", on the other hand, it sent engineering troops to step up the reinforcement of a main road for armored forces to use when launching attacks. Allied governments are also considering how many troops they should send to participate in the ground invasion.
throughout the war, although the CIA has always denied its relationship with the KLA, it has actually been working closely with it to collect the deployment of Yugoslav troops in Kosovo. At the end of May, the KLA armed forces launched a powerful offensive with NATO support and air cooperation. NATO military commanders now believe that the offensive may be an important reason for the sudden compromise between President Milosevic and his generals, who thought it was a prelude to NATO's ground invasion.
invasion plan
On March 24th, the first day of the Kosovo war, President Clinton said to the nation, "I am not going to send our troops to fight in Kosovo." However, in mid-April, on the eve of the summit to commemorate NATO's 5th anniversary, although the Pentagon was still not interested in launching a ground attack, American General Clark, commander-in-chief of NATO, called together British officers at NATO headquarters in Mons, Belgium, to listen to their opinions on various ground war options. After the meeting, Clinton decided that if aerial bombing failed and ground invasion became the only way to win the war, he would send troops to participate in the war.
In Mons, Clark's military staff told him that in order to get Serbs out of Kosovo, ground troops had to be used. Therefore, American and allied troops must be deployed as soon as possible, because the invasion time must be set before winter.
On the eve of the opening of the 5th anniversary summit of NATO on April 24th, Clinton asked British Prime Minister Tony Blair to stop talking openly about the ground invasion, so as not to cause problems in the allied countries, and make the Russians unwilling to work hard for diplomatic solutions. In return, Clinton agreed to upgrade NATO's original emergency plan.
As a result, dozens of officers from the Mons headquarters of NATO and 6 military personnel from the European headquarters of the U.S. military in Heidelberg, Germany began to work together to formulate a top-secret invasion plan. By mid-May, Clark had a pre-selection plan for ground invasion, and planned to use 175, troops to launch a full-scale offensive against Yugoslavia from the south through a road in Albania. The White House called it "Weiss Plan", and it was marked as "B”(B－Minus" plan on NATO's operational map.
Clark returned to Washington in May, hoping that the White House would approve the ground invasion plan before June 1st and complete the deployment before September 1st. However, the White House hopes to postpone the decision as much as possible, only hoping for good weather, and still taking aerial bombing as the best policy. Berger asked Clark to postpone the deadline for making a final decision for at least 1 days.
At the same time, Clark ordered the engineering troops of the United States, Germany and Italy to seize the time to reinforce the road so that it can withstand the passage of heavy tanks and artillery; German and British troops were ordered to prepare pontoons and other equipment to transport NATO armored forces by water. On May 19th, in the heavily guarded conference room of the Pentagon, Clark briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on his "sub-B" plan, but the response was cold, and the participants were skeptical about its feasibility. After the meeting, Secretary of Defense Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Sheldon reported their views on the plan to Clinton and reiterated their reluctance to send ground troops. Sheldon is unwilling to launch a large-scale ground war and thinks that air strikes can work.
Clinton's national security team is more interested in the ground invasion plan than the commanders in the Pentagon. They even asked the Pentagon to consider it more appropriate to launch a ground attack on Yugoslavia from several directions-Bulgaria in the east, Bosnia in the west and even Hungary in the north.
On May 27th, a secret meeting was held in the German Ministry of Defence, which lasted from 1 am to 4: 3 pm. The defense ministers had a heated debate on whether to launch a ground invasion. British Defense Secretary Robertson urged NATO to immediately prepare to send ground troops to Yugoslavia, and promised to send 5, British officers and men to participate in the war. Britain is the main promoter of the ground invasion, and it is Britain that lobbies American officials at every pass. Just before this secret meeting, on May 23rd, Blair had telephoned to persuade Clinton to agree to let NATO Secretary-General make a detailed ground action plan. British officials are well aware that the relationship between Clark and Cohen is deteriorating, because Cohen strongly opposes ground invasion and thinks that it is much safer to insist on air strikes than ground attacks. The British gave Clark the phone records of Blair and Clinton in case the US Department of Defense did not inform Clark of the tacit understanding reached between Croatia and Bulgaria.
Germany and Italy have reservations about the ground invasion. France does not categorically oppose the invasion, but thinks it is too late to prepare for the offensive before winter. At the end of the meeting, the ministers agreed that NATO could not afford to lose the war, and the five governments needed to make a decision on whether to dispatch ground troops within one week.
The CIA is in action
At the same time, in a secret operation center in the Albanian border city of Kukes, American and European special forces are discussing how to transform the KLA armed forces into a light infantry team and "go to the enemy's rear to blow up bridges". In fact, since the end of April, the CIA and NATO have been working closely with the KLA. Its intelligence station in Tirana and 24 US special forces in Kukes and Durres have used KLA armed personnel to collect information on the deployment of Yugoslav troops. However, the United States does not want to disclose this relationship with the KLA, because there is evidence that KLA militants are also engaged in atrocities and drug smuggling. In February 1998, Clinton's special envoy to the Balkans characterized KLA as a "terrorist". In order to hide people's eyes and ears, the US military used the Albanian Second Army as an intermediary. Representatives of the KLA met with Albanian military officers in the Albanian Ministry of Defence every day, and every time there was a CIA officer and an Apache attack helicopter group officer present. Before the war, American military officers who had been stationed in Kosovo as United Nations observers for verification and were forced to leave were also in close contact with the leaders of KLA.
On May 26th, with the support of the Albanian army's artillery, the KLA armed forces launched an offensive against the Yugoslav army, but in the following three days, they suffered a terrible defeat, and 25 elite soldiers were trapped on the Pastrik Mountain by 7 Yugoslav soldiers. Clark said in a video conference: "I won't let the Serbs occupy that mountain. If we can't help Kejie hold that mountain, Americans will bleed for it in the future. "
On June 7th, the United States dispatched two B-52 bombers for rescue, and all the bombs on the plane were dropped on the positions defended by two battalions of Yugoslav troops. NATO believes that the bombing killed hundreds of Yugoslav soldiers and may be a turning point for NATO to win. But after the war, they found no signs of mass death there. What surprised NATO commanders even more was that so many Yugoslav troops still withdrew from Kosovo. Their conclusion is that the third army of Yugoslavia can still persist in Kosovo for weeks or even months. However, Clark later said in a speech in a think tank in Washington that the bombing of Mount Pastrik by B-52 made Milosevic think that NATO would launch a ground invasion of Yugoslavia, which was a turning point for him to agree to withdraw his troops.
Whether Milosevic thought so at that time or not, when Yugoslavia was preparing to withdraw its troops, Clinton was really seriously considering the ground attack plan. At noon on June 2, Berger, assistant to the president for national security affairs, made four points when meeting with several foreign policy experts who advocated ground invasion: the first point is "the war must be won"; The fourth point is that "any scheme can be considered". When someone asked, "Does the President support sending ground troops?" Berger replied, "Recall my first point. This is tantamount to saying that if the ground invasion can win the war, the government is ready to do it. Berger's words surprised experts. That afternoon, Clinton's aides worked out several options, including: dividing up several "safe areas" in Kosovo; Armed with the "KLA", or launched a full-scale invasion of Yugoslavia through Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria and Hungary. At 6: 3 the next morning, the White House Situation Room got a report. Milosevic gave in and agreed to accept the NATO peace agreement. But the White House was worried that there was something wrong with it. In the afternoon, Clinton still discussed sending troops to Kosovo with members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
On the evening of June 7th, the B-52 bomber bombed the Pastric Mountains again. The next day, NATO and Russia reached an agreement on the draft United Nations peace. Two days later, Milosevic signed the agreement, allowing 5, NATO soldiers to invade Kosovo, but the word "invasion" was replaced by "peacekeeping".
terror deterrence
One of the lies of this war is that the leaders of the 19 NATO member countries directed the bombing of Yugoslavia through a committee, but the allied generals and political leaders knew in their hearts that important decisions-such as whether to bomb buildings inhabited by a large number of civilians-were only made by the leaders of the United States, Britain and France, and France usually hesitated during the discussion.
Whenever NATO bombs killed Kosovo refugees or Serbian civilians, the international community immediately reacted strongly, and people's support rate for the bombing declined. Therefore, before approving the bombing target, the leaders of the United States, Britain and France had to weigh the shocking effect after the bombing and the possible opposition from public opinion. These leaders knew in advance the possible civilian casualties, but in order to crush Milosevic's will, they should not only cause suffering to the Serbs, but also avoid causing too many civilian casualties. In the words of White House spokesman Lockhart, "Let Belgrade fall into darkness", but be careful.
On April 3rd, when President Chirac saw the building of the Ministry of Interior of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in flames, he realized that the air raid had gone far beyond the original target after 11 days. He asked for an urgent call with Clinton to discuss the strategy implemented by NATO commander Clark. It was Easter, and there was no confidential telephone in the medieval castle where Chirac was located. The White House immediately ordered a communication team to be sent to united states european command, Germany, to connect Chirac with the most confidential Stu-3 telephone line. Chirac said on the phone that he wanted to have a say in all major decisions about the war, just like the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Britain. Clinton said that the approval process for bombing targets has been too slow. He agreed to include the French, and proposed to make a list of the major bombing actions that each of the three people has the right to veto. Chirac demanded that any bombing of Montenegro be reviewed by him. Blair demanded veto power over all targets attacked by B-52 bombers taking off from Britain. All three leaders demanded veto power over bombing targets that caused heavy casualties or had a significant impact on the lives of ordinary people, such as power grids, telephone systems, and < P > buildings in downtown Belgrade.
The French chief of staff and other European officials still keep calling to ask NATO commander Clark about the bombing, so that he spends half of his time talking with allied military and political officials on the phone every day. To this end, Washington set up a "management Committee" to ease the different opinions on military operations. The core figures of the Committee are the so-called five-member group: US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the foreign ministers of Britain, France, Germany and Italy. They hold a five-party conference call almost every day to maintain unity. The Italian foreign minister often expressed concern about the escalating bombing. Albright first called the German and British foreign ministers and asked them to do the work of the Italian foreign minister. Sometimes, even Britain will hesitate to determine the bombing target. For example, when choosing the power supply network in Belgrade as the bombing target, British Foreign Minister Cook thinks that it will affect some big hospitals. But Albright finally persuaded him.
in mid-April, NATO commander Clark believed that Yugoslav troops hid helicopters and fighter planes in the bunker of Podgorica airport in Montenegro and used the radar there to track the whereabouts of NATO fighters, so he ordered the destruction of the airport. At first, France did not agree. General Clark and Albright, Berger, Cohen and Sheldon set out to call their French counterparts to persuade them. France finally gave in to their plan.
under Clinton's leadership, although the ground invasion advocated by Britain was not adopted by NATO leaders, they agreed to take two other important steps: bombing Milosevic's personal property and the property of his relatives and friends; It is necessary to bomb not only the TV broadcasting building, but also the transportation, water and electricity systems, so as to have a great impact on the lives of a large number of civilians and implement the terror deterrent of war.
At the end of April, before American warplanes fired missiles at the headquarters building of the Socialist Party in Belgrade, NATO personnel in charge of making bombing plans explained in detail the risks involved in the bombing in a document handed over to US President Bill Clinton, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac. The document is marked next to the photo of the headquarters building: "The accompanying losses are: 5 to 1 government and party employees will be killed; The shock wave of the bomb will kill about 25 people. " Officials in Washington and London quickly approved the bombing plan. France, however, is reluctant to mention that there are Yugoslav television and radio stations in the party building.
The Americans tried to blow up the power system of Yugoslavia in the first week of the war, but they were opposed by France. In order to break the deadlock, the military leaders of the two countries exchanged views on how to cause power system paralysis. The United States proposed to blow up the power transmission line, and its repair work would take several days or even weeks, but France considered this plan unacceptable. The United States has also proposed to use a top secret weapon CBU-94, which will only cut off power for several hours. Sheldon also showed his French counterparts the effectiveness of this weapon. But France still hesitates. The Americans were in a hurry and asked the French to come up with other ways. As a result, the French had to accept the opinion of the United States. Late at night on May 3, the Americans ordered the bombing of the power grid and substations in Yugoslavia.